THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
TheCounciloftheEuropeanunion(hereinaftertheCouncil)isthepoliticalandlegislativeorganoftheEU,andplaythedominantrolegivenbytheTreatyinECaffairs.PriortotheentryintoforceofMasstrichttreatyinNovember1993,theCouncil'sfulltitlewastheCounciloftheEuropeancommunities(colloquiallyknownastheCouncilofministers).FollowingtheentryintoforceofTEU,theCouncildecidedthatitshouldhenceforthbecalledthe'CounciloftheEuropeanunion.ThereisalsoanotherCouncil,whichiscalled'EuropeanCouncil'.TheEuropeanCouncilisconsistofheadsofstatesorgovernmentofthemembernations,akindsofultimateministers,andArticle2ofthesingleEuropeanActof1987formallyrecognizestheirexistence.IncontrasttotheEuropeanCouncil,theCouncilrepresentsthememberstates.Article146ECprovidesthat:"TheCouncilshallconsistofarepresentativeofeachmemberstateatministeriallevel,authorizedtocommitthegovernmentofthatmemberstates."So,accordingtotheprovision,thenationalinterestsofeachmemberstatearerepresentedonit.Itistheprincipalandultimatedecision-makingorganofEU.SometimestheCouncilisregardedas'thecommunitylegislator',butIthinkthisisdoublymisleading.Ontheonehand,thecommunitydoesnothavealegislaturebutalegislativeprocesstowhichotherinstitutionsandorgans,besidestheCouncil,variouslycontribute,ontheotherhand,ananalysisontheprovisionofthetreatiesconferringpowersontheCouncilshowsthatitsfunctionsarebynomeansconfinedtolegislating.Thereisatendencytoequatecommunityinstitutionswithfamiliarnationalinstitutions,suchasCouncilandEuropeanparliament---theupperandlowerhousesofthelegislature,commission---thegovernment,ortoregardthemasevolvingnaturallytowardsthiskindofmodel,butIthinkthisseemsmisconceived.Thefactthattheinstitutionalsystemofthecommunitieshastofitis;thecontinuedexistenceofthememberstatesasstatesinthefullsenseofinternationallaws,andtheystillhaveprerogativesandsymbols,self-consciousnessandvisibilitytotheirowncitizensandtothewiderworld.AlthoughtheTEUpledgestheUnion'srespectfor'thenationalidentitiesofitsmemberstates',thisfactwillnotchangeinashortrun.
I.FUNCTION
Article145ofEUprovidesthat:
Toensurethattheobjectivesetoutinthistreatyisattained,theCouncilshall,inaccordancewiththeprovisionofthistreaty.
---Ensurecoordinationofthegeneraleconomicpoliciesofthememberstates.
---Havepowertotakedecisions.
---Conferonthecommission,intheactswhichtheCounciladopts,powersfortheimplementationoftheruleswhichtheCouncillaydown…
ExperienceshowsthatdevelopmentofcommunitysystemhassignificantlyextendedthepowersconferredontheCouncil,farfromdiminishingtherangeofit.Atthesametime,thewideningofactivitiestobeundertakenwillbringtheCouncilafurtheraccretionofresponsibilities,suchasincludingcoveredbytitleVandtitleVIoftheTEO(thesecondandthirdpillaroftheEU).
IngeneraltermsthesecondindentofArticle145ECreferstotheCouncil'spowertotakedecisions.ThishasgenerallybeenindicativeofthemajorfunctionoftheCouncilasbeingtheprincipallegislativebodyofthecommunity.Andthewordwaschosensmartly,becausetheCouncilcanadoptawholevarietyoflegallybindingactsfordifferentpurposesunderdifferentprovisionsofhetreaty.
First,theCouncilnormallyhastherightsoffinaldecisionontheadoptionofactscompleting,developingorextendingthebodyofprimarylawscontainedintheectreaty,whetherfororagainst,sothecommissionhasbeengivenarightofdecisionindependentoftheCouncilveryunusuallyintheecsystem,andthistendstobeinregardtomattersonwhichbasicrulesandlimitingitsdiscretionarespeltoutinthetreaty.
Second,becausethecommunitysystemdoesnothaveasoleandseparatelegislature,thereisalsonoinstitutionhavinginherentexecutivepowersfortheimplementationoflegislation:unlessaCouncildecisionspeciallycreatesderivedpower,furtherdevelopmentofitsprovisionswillmeanhavingrecoursetotheprocedurelaiddownbythetreaty.ThethirdindentofArticle145ECestablishedthatpowerstoimplementCouncilmeasuresshould,asageneralrule,beconferredonthecommission,buttheCouncilmaystill,inspecificcases,reservetherightstoexercisedirectlyimplementingpoweritself.ButiftheCouncilwanttoexercisetheimplementingrightsdirectly,thecourtofjusticeinacasehassaidthat'itmuststateindetailthegroundsforsuchadecision'.Onmattersofpoliticalsensitivityinseveralofthememberstates,itiseasytoseewhytheCouncilshouldwishtoretainameasureofcontroloverthecommission'sexerciseofderivedpower,afteralltheCouncilistherepresentativeofinterestofmemberstates.
Third,agreementsbetweentheECandthirdcountriesorinternationalorganizationsarenegotiatedbythecommission,buttheauthorizationbytheCouncilisrequiredfortheopeningofnegotiation,andfinallyitistheCouncilthathaspowertotakethedecisionwhetherornottoconcludeanyagreement.Article228(1)providesthat:"wherethistreatyprovidesfortheconclusionofagreementsbetweenthecommunityandormorestatesorinternationalorganizations,thecommissionshallmakerecommendationstotheCouncil,whichshallauthorizethecommissiontoopenthenecessarynegotiationsappointedbytheCounciltoassistitinthistaskandwithintheframeworkofsuchdirectivesastheCouncilmayissuetoit."ThepoweroftheCouncilinrespectoftheacceptanceofnewobligationsforthecommunityininternationallawarethecorollaryofitsroleintheinternallegislativesphere.
Finally,theCouncil'spowerinthebudgetaryfieldismorelimitsthaninthelegislativefield.Theeffectoffinancialtreatyof1970and1975wastoestablishaclear-cutdistinctionbetweentheallocationoflegislativepower,ontheonehand,andbudgetarypower,ontheotherhand:therighttofinallyontheexpenditurenecessarilyresultingfromthetreatyorfromactsadoptedinaccordancewith"compulsoryexpenditure"belongtotheCouncil,whiletheEuropeanparliamenthastherighttodecide"non-compulsoryexpenditure".Atthetimewhenthedistinctionbetweencompulsoryandnon-compulsoryexpenditurewasfirstintroduced,agriculturalexpenditurewasbyfarthemostsignificantelementofthebudget,butthatsituationhaschanged:theproportionofthebudgetaccountforbynon-compulsoryexpenditureshasrisensharply,andsohasthepoliticalsignificanceofexpenditureonthestructuralfundsandfinancialco-operationwiththirdcountries,withacorrespondingincreaseintheEuropeanparliament'spower.However,itmustbestressedthattheprovisionofresourcesheededtofinancecommunityexpenditureinvolvestheexerciseoflegislativepowers,notbudgetary.InaccordancewithArticle201EC,theprocedurelaiddownforthecreationofthecommunities'ownresourcesculminatesinadecisionbytheCouncil,whichhasthetoberecommendedtothememberstatesforadoptioninaccordancewiththeirrespectiveconstitutionalrequirements.
Fromanotheraspect,thescopeofdecisiontakenbytheCouncilhasbeenexpandedalso.SincethebeginningoftheEEC,theobligationtoensureo-ordinationofthegeneraleconomicpoliciesofthememberstateshasbeenlaiddowntheCouncil.Withthebuilduptoeconomicandmonetaryunion,theentryintoforceofTEUhasbroughtafurtherintensificationoftheco-ordinanceeffortandsignificantnewpowerfortheCouncilinthesecondandthirdstages.
UnderCouncildecision90/141,theCouncilwasrequiredtoundertake"multilateralsurveillance"ofallaspectsofeconomicpolicywithaviewtotheattainmentofprogressiveconvergenceduringstageoneofEMU.InthelatterstageofEMU,theCouncilwillbecomemorethansimplyaninfluentialco-ordinatorofeconomicpoliciesmadeinthecapitalsofthememberstates.
TheCouncilhasbeengivenanevenmorethanusuallypredominantroleintheinstitutionalarrangementsthatapplyunderthe"secondandthirdpillars"oftheEuropeanunion----thecommonforeignandsecuritypolicyandcooperationinthefieldsofjusticeandhomeaffairs.TheCouncilistobetheforuminwhichtheenhancedco-operationenvisagedbytheTEUwillbecarriedforward.ArticleJ.2placesanobligationonthememberstatesbyprovidingthat:
"1.MemberstatesshallinformandconsultoneanotherwithintheCouncilonanymattersofforeignandsecuritypolicyofgeneralinterestinordertoensurethattheircombinedinfluenceisexertedaseffectivelyapossiblebymeansofconcertedandconvergentaction.
2.Wheneveritdeemsnecessary,theCouncilshalldefineacommonposition,memberstatesshallensurethattheirnationalpoliciesconformtothecommonpositions.
3.Memberstatesshallupholdthecommonpositioninsuchfora.Ininternationalorganizationsandatinternationalconferenceswherenotallthememberstatesparticipate,thosewhichdotakepartshallupholdthecommonpositions."
Similarly,asregardthemattercoveredbythethirdpillar(justiceandhomeaffairs),thereisalsoadutyofmutualinformationandconsultationwiththeCouncil.ArticleK.3.1TEUprovidesthat:"IntheareasreferredtoArticleK.1,memberstatesshallinformandconsultoneanotherwithintheCouncilwithaviewtocoordinatetheiraction.tothatend,theyshallestablishcollaborationbetweentherelevantdepartmentsoftheiradministrations.IntheotherindentsofArticleK3TEU,theCouncilisempoweredtoadoptjointpositionsandpromote,usingtheappropriateformandprocedures,anyco-operationcontributingtothepursuingoftheobjectivesoftheunion,adoptjointaction,anddrawupconventionswhichitshallrecommendtothememberstatesforadoptioninaccordancewiththeirrespectiveconstitutionalrequirements.
II.Theprocedureofdecision-making
TheCouncilreachesitsdecisionsthroughanegotiatingprocesswhichtheECtreatynormallyrequirestobesetinmotionbyaproposalfromthecommission.thenegotiationprocesshasbeenprofoundlyaffectedbytheextension,pursuanttotheSEA,oftherangeofmattersthatcanbedecidedbyaqualifiedmajority,andtheTEUcontinuesthetrendsetbytheSEA:itwillallowmajoritydecision-makingbytheCouncilinimportantpolicyareas.
Article147ECprovidesthat:"theCouncilshallmeetwhenconvenedbyitspresidentonhisinitiativeorattherequestofoneofitsmemberstatesorofthecommission."Themeetingmaybeconvenedanywhereinthecommunity,thoughtheyarefrequentheldinBrussels.Withrespecttovoting,Article148ECprovidesthat:'saveasotherwiseprovideinthistreaty,theCouncilshallactbyamajorityofitsmembers."Themajorityisnotbasedon'onestate--onevote',itisaweightedsystem.Thetotalnumberofvotesdistributedamongstthe15statesoftheEUis87,thenumberofvotesrequiredtopassamotionwas62:thisisthequalifiedmajority.As148ECprovides:
"Fortheiradaptation,actsoftheCouncilshallrequireatleast:
---62votesinfavorwherethistreatyrequiresthemtobeadoptedonaproposalfromthecommission,
---62votesinfavor,castbyatleast10members,inotherareas."
Here,twocompromisesshouldbenoted.OneisLuxembourgcompromise/accords,anotherisIoanninacompromise.Luxembourgaccordistheresultofacrisisin1962intheCouncil.Originally,somemoresensitiveareasofthetreatywererequiredtobeimplementedonlybyunanimousvote.Itwas,however,intendedthatoncetheperiodofadjustmenttomembershipprovidedbythetreatyhadexpired,memberstateswouldberequiredtomoretowardsqualifiedmajorityvoting.Thisdidn'thappen.Themoretowardsagreateruseofqualifiedvotingwasfrustratedin1963whenFranceabsenteditselffromtheCouncilforthelatterpartofthatyear.Intheend,Luxembourgaccordcameup.TheLuxembourgaccorddidnothavetheforceoflaw,butitwasfollowedinthepractice,withtheresultthatinmanyareastheCouncilsoughtunanimitywherethetreatywouldnothaverequiredit.Ioanninacompromisetookplacein1994.SpainandtheUKobjectedtowhattheysawasthedilutionoftheirvotingstrength.Theysuggestedthatoldnumberofvotesrequiredtoblockaproposal(23)shouldremaininplace.EventuallytheIoanninacompromisewasagreedwiththeresultthattheblockingminorityincreasedto71percentofthenewtotal,butitstatescarryingtogether23to25votesintendtovoteagainsttheproposal,thennegotiationswillcontinueinanattempttosatisfytheirconcerns.
TherelationshipbetweentheCouncilandtheEPhasevolvedgreatlyinrecentyearsandtheTEUbroughtadditionalchanges.TheEP'sabilitytoaffectthecourseofCouncilnegotiationsvaries,dependingonthelegislativeprocedureapplicabletothemeasureunderconsiderconsiderations.
Forinstance,undertheco-operationprocedure,certainoftheoptionsavailabletotheEPatsecondreadinghaveadirectimpactontheCouncil'slegalsituation:thus,iftheEPapprovesthecommonposition,eitherexpresslyortacitly,itplacestheCouncilunderalegaldutytoadopttheactinquestioninaccordancewiththatposition.While,ifthecommonpositionisrejected,thiswillpreventtheCouncilfromactingatsecondreadingotherwisethanbyunanimity.Underthenewco-decisionprocedureofArticle189b,iftheCounciliswillingtoacceptamendmentswhichtheEPhasproposed,itwillberequiredtoparticipateintheConciliationCommitteewithrepresentativesoftheEP,whereagenuineeffortmustbemadetoreachagreementonajointtext,anddelegationswillbeawarethat,intheabsenceofagreement,aunilateraldecisionbytheCouncilconformingitscommonpositionwouldbeliabletotheEP'sveto,althoughtheriskbecessenedifsomeoftheamendmentspreviouslyputforwardbytheEPareincluded.
Therearealotofcomplaintaboutthe"democraticdeficit"inntheEuropeancommunitysystem,butIthinkthistendtounderestimatethecontributionoftheCouncilinthisregard.
TheCouncilisnotarepresentativeassemblypurportingtoexpressthecollectivewillofelectors.Thelineofpoliticalresponsibilityrunsfromitsindividualmemberstodifferentnationalelectorates,bywayofnationalparliamentandpoliticalparties,notfromtheCouncilasaninstitution.Becausepoliticalpressuresarechanneledthroughnationalinstitutions,democraticcontrolisindirecttherefore.MinistersorrepresentativesareawareoftheeffectaCouncildecisionmayhaveonthestandingoftheirgovernment:theyknowthattheywillbecalledontoaccountindetail,tocolleaguesingovernmentandtonationalparliamentandpublicopinion,fortheirperformanceinchampioningtheirmemberstates'perceivedinterests.
Becauseofthefactthatpoliticsstillmainlyhappensatnationallevel,thedemocraticaccountabilityoftheCouncilmembersisindirect.OfcourseitistruealoyalandvigorousministermaydefendinCouncilthepositionsdevelopedwithinhisnationaldemocraticprocess,butqualifiedmajoritymaydecidethematteragainsthim.Inmostcases,all15oftheministersarewinnersinsomedegree,althoughthefinalcompromiseisunlikelytobeidealfromthepointofviewofanyofthem.Thisisinthenatureofasystemunderwhichmemberstateshaveagreedtopoolsomeoftheirsovereignrights,intheexpectationofbeingabletoachievegreateroverallsatisfactionoftheiraimsthroughactingtogether.
Untilthe1997TreatyofAmsterdamisratified,theEuropeanParliamentcanbesaidtohavenomorethanaweak,albeitgenuine,legislativerole.InordertobroadenEP'sroleitwasgivenpowerundertheTEUtosetupatemporarycommitteeofinquirytoinvestigateallegedcontravenionsormaladministrationintheimplementationofcommunitylaw,andhasbeenrequiredtoappointanOmbudsmantoreceiveandenquireintocomplaintsofmaladministrationintheactivitiesofECinstitutionsorbodies.Butbothofthetwopowershaveexceptions.
ThepowergivenotheEPatMasstrichtwentsomewaytoredresstheinstitutionalbalanceinthecommunity,inwhichnationalinterestsasrepresentedbytheCouncilofministershaspredominated,andtoremedythemuch-criticized'democraticdeficit'in5hedecision-makingprocess.The1997treatyhasgiventheEPamuchmoreactiverolebothinthefarmingandinthemaskingoflegislation.ThemakingoflegislationwillbebywayofgivingtheEPfarmoreextensiveresponsibilityviaitsroleandenhancepowerinrelationtotheCouncilintheso-called'co-decision'procedure.Criticssuggestedthatthesechangesdidnotgofarenoughandthattheparliamentshouldhavemorepowers.ButIthinkbecausetheEUisonthewayofdeveloping,itneedmoreefficiencythandemocracy,itmayhinderthedevelopmentoftheintegrationprocess.
III.FUTUREOFTHECOUNCIL
ThesystemofECisveryspecialandEChasaninstitutionalstructuretomatch.Boththecommunityandtheunionaresupposedonthecontinuedexistenceofthememberstates.Theseretainthebulkofgovernmentalpowers,andtheyremainthemainarenaofpoliticalactivityandthefocusofloyaltyfortheircitizens.ThevirtueofthecommunitymodelofEuropeanconstructionispreciselythatthememberstatesarenotdiminishedbutareboundtogetherbyrulesthatrequirethemtoactincreasinglyincommon.ItisfutiletoimaginethataninstitutionsuchastheCouncilcouldfunctionasifitwereanationalparliament,butIthinktheCounciliscapableofdoingitsjobefficientlywhilemaintaininganacceptablelevelofaccountabilitybeforepublicopinioninthedifferentmemberstates.
【参考文献】
BIBLIOGRAPHY1.JosephineSteiner&Lornawoods,TEXTBOOKONECLAW,BlackstonePressLTD.,2.NigelFoster,ECLEGISLATION1998-9,BlackstonePressLTD.,3.StephenWeatherill,casesandmeterialsonECLAW,4thedition,BlackstonePressLTD.,4.GeorgeA.Bermann,casesandmeterialsonEuropeanCommunityLaw,WestPublishingCo.,5.隋伟，杨明光：《欧洲联盟法律制度简论》，南开大学出版社【写作年份】2000【学科类别】国际法->国际公法
页:
[1]