WTO 争端解决机制：改革方案（II〕

　　TheWTODisputeSettlementSystemroposalsforReform（Ⅱ）
   
    Author:WuGe
   
    III.ProposalsonDisputeSettlementProcedure
   
    1.Consultation
   
    Consultationisthoughtasaformofnegotiationinsettlingdisputes.ProposalsastoconsultationsubmittedbytheWTOMembersfocusondiscussingthefunctionoftheconsultationasmutuallysatisfactorysolutionandfact-findingbetweenpartiestothedispute.Butthereisweaknesswhichisreferredtoaffectthefunctionofconsultationduringthenegotiation.
   
    UndertheDSU,theWTOMemberspreferanegotiated“solutionmutuallyacceptabletothepartiestoadisputeandconsistentwiththecoveredagreement”.Themutuallyacceptablesolutionmaybeobtainedfromconsultationsor“furtheraction”includingpanelproceedingandAppellateBodyproceeding.Duringtheconsultationprocedure,theeffectivenessoftheseconsultationsdependssolelyontheparties’willingness“toengageintheseproceduresingoodfaithinanefforttoresolvethedispute”asrequiredbythegeneralprovisionssectionoftheDSU.WTOMembersexpresslyaffirmedtheirresolvetostrengthenandimprovetheeffectivenessoftheconsultationproceduresintheDSU.ButtheDSUdoesnotprovideenoughprovisionstoguaranteetheeffectiveness.ItiseasyforanyMembertoabusetheflexibilityinherentinthedisputesettlementmechanismtoavoidordelayrealconsultationorfurtheraction.UndertheDSU,therearenoexpressobligationsonthecomplainantinthisaspect.Itisenoughforthecomplainingpartyonlytosubmitarequestforconsultationsandpossiblyholdaninitialmeeting.Theonlyremainingrequirementtorequesttheestablishmentofapanelistowaittheresponseofthedefendantpartyandtheexpiryoftheregulatedperiodaftersubmittingtherequestforconsultations.Suchregulationseasilyreducetheconsultationphasetoamereformality,whichisreallyahurdleinthewayofpanelproceedingwhenapartywantstoenterthepanelproceedingquickly.
   
    TheconsultationssectioninArticle4oftheDSUjustsetsforththetermsandsimpleproceduresofconsultations.TheobligationsontheMembersinthesectionarevagueandrelyheavilyongoodfaith.Anypartytothedisputemayeasilyusetheconsultationphaseasamereformalitytoavoidatreatyobligation,suchas“goodfaith”principleandbesteffortsobligation.Soconsiderablediscretionislefttotheparties.Theadjustmentproposedinanumberofsubmissionstriestomakeuptheweaknesstomakeitpossibletoreviewtheconsultationsbythepanel.Increasingtheobligationsandthuslimitingtheflexibilityinconsultationstagearemainmethodsmentionedinlotsofproposals.
   
    Holdingatleasttwomeetingsandrequirementofwrittenevidencearecommonrecommendationsinproposals.Article4.4oftheDSUrequiresthattherequestisinwritingandgivesreasonsincludingidentificationofthelegalbasisofthecomplaint.Anindicationofthelegalbasiswouldnolongersuffice.Thecomplainant’scaseshouldbestatedadequatelyandunambiguously.TheEuropeanCommunitiesgoevenfurtherbyproposingthatanylegalclaimintherequestfortheestablishmentofapanelshouldbeincludedintheconsultations,orroseduringtheconsultations,confirmedinwriting,andfollowedbynewconsultationsunlessthedefendingpartyagreesotherwise.Theseproposalssetthetrendfortheformalizationoftheprocedurewherebytheeffortsofthepartieshavetobeevidencedinwriting.
   
    Additionalproposalssuggestthatsomewrittendocuments,suchaswrittenquestionsandanswers,andtheintroductionofagreedwrittenrecordsoftheconsultations,shouldbeused.Thesedocumentsshouldgiveasubsequentpanelthepossibilityofinvestigatinginapreliminaryphasewhethertherehasbeenanattempttoobtainasatisfactorilyacceptableresolutionofthedisputeingoodfaith.Thefollowingsanctionsareproposedifaparty’swrittensubmissionsarefoundlacking:extraconsultationsforclaimsthathavenotbeenthesubjectofpreviousconsultations;ifapartyrefusestoreplytoawrittenquestion,theotherpartycouldbegivendirectaccesstoapanel;ifananswerisfoundtobeinadequate,thepanelcanrequestfurtherinformation.Allthesemeasuresareaimedatstrengtheningtheroleoftheconsultationsandforcingthepartiestogothroughtheconsultativephase.ButonepointneedstobepointedoutthatmostoftheWTOMembersstillremaintheopinionthattheconsultationprocessshouldkeepasinformalaspossibleeventheyagreethattheconsultativeprocessshouldbemoreregulated.
    Inrelationtofact-finding,someproposalsregardeditasthesecondfunctionofDSUconsultationbesidesthefirstfunction,mutuallysatisfactorysolution.Undertheprincipleofgoodfaith,consultationswillresultinaclarificationofthelegalclaimsinvolvedinadisputeandthefactsrelatingtothoseclaims.Theclaimsthataremadeandthefactsthatareestablishedduringconsultationsareveryimportantinshapingthesubstanceandthescopeofthecaseduringthesubsequentpanelproceeding.Strengtheningtheroleoffact-findingintheconsultationphasemightcontributetoincreasetheeffectivenessoftheconsultationphase.
   
    2.Panels
   
    2.1Appointment
   
    Thepresentmethodofcompositionofpanels,characterizedbyacase-by-caseselection,hascausedsomecriticisms.UndertheDSU,theSecretariatcanmakesuggestions,butitisthepartiesthathavetoagreeontheidentityofthepanellists.Theactualprocedureappearsveryclumsybecausetheparties’viewsdivergegreatlyastowhatmakesagoodpanellist.PartiesalwaysmakeinquiriestheSecretariataboutthepersonality,thequality,thenationality,andtheviewsofthecandidatesbeforetheymakeadecision.Inpractice,WTOMembersdistinguishtwotypesofpanellistsonthebaseoftheirbackground.Thefirsttypeofpanellistsaregovernmentofficials,whilethesecondtypearepractitionersoracademics.WTOMemberspreferoneortheotherindifferentsituation.Similarly,nationalityissueisanotherbighurdlefacedbythepartiestodecideapanellist.AccordingtoArticle8.3ofDSU,nationalsofpartiesorthirdpartiesshallnotserveonapanelconcernedwiththatdispute.Inaddition,DSUhasadoptedaveryextensiveinterpretationofthenationalityconcept.Wherecustomsunionsorcommonmarketsarepartiestoadispute,nationalsofallmembercountriesofthecustomsunionorcommonmarketsareexcludedfrombecomingpanellists.Thisextensivenationalityconceptcausesabigbarrierinselectingthemostqualifiedpanellistsbecauseitoftenleavesratherfewpossibilitiesforthepartiestoselectpanellistsfromaverylimitedlist,especiallyinmultipartycomplaints.Asaoftenresult,ifthepartiescannotagreeontheidentityofallthepanellistswithinthetimeframe,thentheDirector-Generalwillnominatethemembersofthepanel.Butthenominationstillmustbedoneaftertheconsultationwiththepartiestothedispute.Allthistakestimeandpreventsthepartiesfrompayingmoreattentiononthepreparationoftheircase.
   
    TheEuropeanCommunity,whichalwaysmeetstheaforementionedissues,hasproposedastandingPanelBodytoresolvethepanelcompositionquestion.Initsproposal,afixedrosterofpanellistsandarotationmechanismaresuggestedtoexcludethepartiesfromdecidingthecompositionofapanel.Theideawouldpromotetoavoidthecurrentclumsytime-consumingprocessinthecompositionofapanelonacase-by-casebasis.AstandingpanelwouldenhanceconsistencyintheinterpretationoftherathercomplexWTOrules.Itwouldpermitcoordinationbetweenthevariousdivisionsofthestandingpanel,alongthelinesofthefunctionoftheAppellateBody.SomeotherWTOMembersbesidestheEuropeanCommunityintheirproposalsarealsoagreedwiththeidea.Buttherearealsoargumentsagainstastandingpanel.TheargumentsarethatastandingpanelcannotprovideabroadrepresentationoftheWTOmembership.Inaddition,thestandingpanellistscannotprovideenoughconfidenceandtrusttothepartiestothedispute.Thearguments,however,aretooweaktoopposetheestablishmentofastandingpanel.ThewellexistenceofthestandingAppellateBodyhasprovedthattheargumentsagainstthestandingpanelarehardlyconvincing.Especially,therotationmechanismofstandingpanellistscanmakeuptheweaknessoftherepresentationoftheWTOmembership.
   
    ThemodelusedtoselectthefirstmembersoftheAppellateBodycanbereusedtoselectthemembersofthestandingpanel.OnthebaseofsomebroadcriteriaagreeduponbytheWTOmembership,ahigh-levelrepresentativeselectioncommitteeshouldreviewtheapplicationssubmittedbytheMembers,interviewcandidates,andmakerecommendations.
   
    BeforethestandingPanelsuggestedisestablished,therearetwowayssuggestedtoavoidtheclumsytime-consumingselectionprocedureofpanellists.TheadhocchamberprocedureoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeisalwaysonealternativeinpractice.Thisprocedureallowsforacompositionofchambersthattakesintoaccounttheviewsoftheparties.Theirviewslargelydeterminethecompositionofthechamber.Theotheralternativeisthatpreferablecandidatesofpanellistsshouldbeselectedtoprovideabroadscopeofcandidatestotheparties.EventhoughtheexpertsonWTOlawandpolicyarerare,thiswayisratherpracticalatpresentwhentheDSBfacesanincreasingnumberofdisputes.
   
    2.1Proceduraladjustments
   
    ThelinkageofdisputedfactsandlegalclaimsthatsomeWTOMembersproposedwillformthebasisofthepanel’sdeliberations.Whenacomplainingpartyrequeststheestablishmentofapanel,therequestshallbemadeinwritingandshall“identifythespecificmeasuresatissue,andprovideabriefsummaryofthelegalbasisofthecomplaintssufficienttopresenttheproblemclearly.”TheAppellateBodyinsistsontheprincipleofminimumstandardinterpretation,soitissufficientforthecomplainingpartiestolisttheprovisionsofthespecificagreementsthatwereallegedlyviolated,withoutsettingoutdetailedargumentsastowhichspecificaspectsofthemeasuresatissuerelatetowhichspecificprovisionsofthoseagreements.ButtheDSUdoesnotimposeastricttimelimitonwhenevidencemustbesubmittedtoapanelandtheWorkingProceduresofAppendix3oftheDSUdonotprovidecompulsorydeadlineswithwhichapanelmustcomply.Sopartiesstillcanproduceandsubmitadditionalevidenceafterthefirsthearing.Newdisputedfactsandlegalclaimsmaybeaddedfromtheadditionalevidence.Inaddition,thelatersubmissionofadditionalevidencecanobviouslydeprivetheotherpartyofanopportunitytomakeaneffectiverebuttalifitisonlygivenashortperiodtorespondtothenewevidence,especiallycausedelaysofthedueprocess.
    Tosafeguardaparty’sdueprocessrights,thepanelsshouldresolvetheproblemintheinitialmeetingtorequirethatallfactualevidenceshallbesubmittedbynolaterthanthedateofthefirstoralhearing,exceptwithrespecttorebuttalevidenceoranswerstoquestionsfrompanelorotherparties.BesidessomeWTOMembers’proposalsonsuchmatters,theAppellateBodyalsorepeatedlyrequeststhepanelbeabletodealwithsuchmattersasitsjurisdictionandfact-findingphaseinEC-Bananacase.
    3.TheAppellateBody
   
    TheestablishmentoftheAppellateBodytohearappealsprovidesadditional“legalcertaintyandpredictability”tothedisputesettlementsystem.Anappealis“limitedtoissuesoflawcoveredinthepanelreportandlegalinterpretationsdevelopedbythepanel.”Onlypartiestodispute,notthirdparties,mayappealapanelreport.TheAppellateBodyhastheauthorityto“uphold,modifyorreversethelegalfindingsandconclusionsofthepanel.”TheAppellateBodycomprisessevenpersonswhoarerecognizedexpertiseinlaw,internationaltradeandthesubjectofthecoveredagreementsandhavebroadrepresentationsofmembershipintheWTO.SotheAppellateBodyhasenoughabilitytoovercomeandresolveanyquestionsinrelationtoitsownprocedures.TheabilityiswitnessedintheAppellateBodyreportsinwhichlotsofinterestingissueshavebeendiscussed.Theinterestingissuesinclude:thestatusofpriorpanelreports;therightofamembertobringaclaimundertheGATT1994;thespecificityofarequestforestablishmentofapanel;thetermsofreferenceofpanels;judicialeconomy;burdenofproof;thescopeofapplicationoftheGATT1994andtheGATS;nullificationorimpairment;thescopeofappeal;andrepresentationofgovernmentsbyprivatelawyersinAppellateBodyproceeding.ButtherearestillotherproposalsfromtheWTOMembersforreformtostrengthentheAppellateBody.
   
    TheEuropeanCommunityhasproposedtoincreasethenumberoftheAppellateBodyMemberstodealwiththerisingworkload.AndalsotheEuropeanCommunitysuggestedthatthetransparencyintheselectionofAppellateBodyDivisionsshouldbeincreased.Further,theEuropeanCommunityproposesthattheplenaryshouldbeinvolvedincases,whichtheAppellateBodyconsiderssufficientlyimportant.AndthedecisionoftheplenarycouldbemadebythePresidentoftheAppellateBodyorbyaDivision.ThePresidentortheDivisioncouldconsidertheimportanceofthecasepropriomotuorattherequestofaparty.
   
    SeveralotherproposalssuggestthattheAppellateBodyshouldbeconferredtheremandauthority.WhenanewdecisiononthefactsisrequiredbecausetheAppellateBodydecisionisbasedonadifferentinterpretationofthelaw,oronthebasisofadifferentlegalreasoningthanthatofthepanel,oronproceduralmistakes,theAppellateBodymaysendthecasebacktotheoriginalpanelratherthandecidingonthebasisofthefactsdescribedinthepanelreport,factsthatmaynotbeadequatelydescribedinthelightofthenewlegalreasoning.Inaddition,therearealsootherproposalstosuggestthatthetimelimitonappealprocedureshouldbeincreasedfromthecurrent2-3monthstoalongerperiod.AMemberhassuggestedintheDSUReviewthatthetimeframebeincreasedto3-6months.
   
    IV.ProposalsonInstitutionalWeakness
   
    1.Transparency
   
    Article18.2oftheDSUstatesthatsubmissionsofthepartiestopanelsorAppellateBodyproceedingsareconfidential,butthattheycanmaketheirsubmissionspublic.Further,inpracticethepanelandAppellateBodyreports(andallotherWTOdocumentsrelatingtospecificdisputes)arepublishedontheWTOwebsiteimmediatelyafterdistributiontothemembergovernments.Thesemeasurestrytomakeabalancebetweentheconfidenceandthetransparencyofthedisputesettlement.However,therestillhavebeencomplaints,particularlybynon-governmentalorganizations(NGOs),thattheproceedingsofthedisputesettlementsystemlacktransparency.NGOswishtogetmoreinformationsoonersotheycanparticipateeffectivelyinthedefenceofthecoursesforwhichtheystand.Inaddition,theywanttoheightenpublicawarenesstoincreasethelegitimacyofthesystem.ImportantWTOMembers,suchastheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanCommunities,supportsuchideas.Toaccomplishthesegoals,theysuggestedthatsecrecyrestrictionsinparties’submissionsshouldberemovedassoonaspossible,oratleastfromthenon-confidentialpartsthereof.Moreover,theysuggestedthatastrictdeadlineforthepublicsummaryofconfidentialsubmissionsshouldbeapplied.Atthesametime,theysuggestedtheconversiontoopenhearinginordertoincreasethepublic’strustinthesystemandtakeawayanyunfoundedsuspiciousofinvolvementinacover-uporaconspiracythatanon-transparentprocessfosters.However,manyotherWTOMembershaveseriousreservationsaboutgreatertransparencyandopenhearing.TheyfearthatthechangeswouldharmtheintergovernmentalcharacteroftheWTO,andwoulddiminishthecontrolofthepartiesoverthedisputesettlementprocess.Intheirpointofview,theystillregardthedisputesettlementasanarbitralsystem,despitethefactthatthedisputesettlementhasbecomehighlyjudicial.
   
    2.DevelopingCountriesandDisputeSettlementSystem
   
    DevelopingcountriesintheGATThavegraduallyreceivedspecialrulesandmoreandmorefavourabletreatmentsincetheTokyoRound.UndertheDSU,thesespecialtreatmentfordevelopingcountriesexistsinanumberofrespects:·thepossibilityofaspeedierprocess(Art.3.12);
    ·specialconsiderationinconsultations(Arts.4.10,12.10)andinthepanelprocess(Arts.8.10,12.10,12.11);
    ·particularconsiderationtomattersaffectingtheinterestsofdevelopingcountriesinthesurveillancestage(Arts.21.2,21.7,21.8);
    ·specialprovisionsforleast-developedcountries(Art.24);
    ·legalassistancefromtheSecretariat(Art.27.2).
   
    However,toeffectivelyparticipateinthedisputesettlementsystem,developingcountriesarestilleagertogetmoreassistanceinbothsubstantiveWTOlawandintheproceduralaspectsofthedisputesettlementmechanism.Firstly,technicalassistantbytheWTOSecretariatisbelievedmorelimitedinscope.TheminimumrequestseemstobeanincreaseoftheconsultantstaffsprovidedforinArticle27.2oftheDSU.Secondly,itissuggestedthataPermanentDefenseCounselshouldbeestablishedtoassistdevelopingcountrieswhenevercasesarebroughtagainstthem.ManycountrieshavesuggestedthatWTObudgetsurplusesshouldbeusedtocreateareservefundtofinancethisCounsel.Thirdly,agroupofdevelopedanddevelopingcountrieshaveannouncedinSeattletheestablishmentofanAdvisoryCentreforWTOLaw,toassistdevelopingcountriesintheirparticipationinWTOdisputesettlementbyorganizingseminars,arranginginternshipsforofficialsfromdevelopingcountryMembers,andadvisingdevelopingcountriesonthemeritsofparticularproceedings.Finally,developingcountriesfacetheproblemofenforcingthefindingsoftheadoptedreportsbecausetheyhavenotsufficienteconomicpower.Thethreatofretaliationfromthedevelopingcountriestotheaccusedcountries,especiallydevelopedcountries,isnotusuallyeffective.Underthesituation,monetaryremediesaresuggestedaswelljointandcollectiveretaliation.
   
    V.Conclusion
   
    Inconclusion,theproposalsforreforminWTODisputeSettlementfocusingontheprocedureandinstitutionsystemmaybenumerous.Someoftheproposals,inrelationtoconsultation,panellistappointment,procedureadjustment,AppellateBody,transparencyanddevelopingcountriesmentionedinthispaper,mayormaynotrepresentthegeneralview.Moreover,itisquitepossiblethatnewissueswillappearinthenearfutureeitherfollowingthenewreportsadoptedfromtheWTOpanelsandtheAppellateBodyornewcountriesbeingmembersofWTO.SoitisnecessaryforustocontinuetokeepattentiononthenewdevelopmentoftheWTODisputeSettlement.
   
    Footnotes
    UnitedNations,HandbookonThePeacefulSettlementofDisputesBetweenStates,10(1992)(OLA/COD/2394).
    DSU,Article3.7.
    DSU,Article4.5.
    DSU,Article3.10.
    DSU,Article4.1.
    DSU,Article4.3,4.7.AccordingtoArticle4.3ofDSU,iftheMemberdoesnotrespondwithin10daysafterthedateofreceiptoftherequest,ordoesnotenterintoconsultationswithinaperiodofnomorethan30days,oraperiodotherwisemutuallyagreed,afterthedateofreceiptoftherequest,thentheMemberthatrequestedtheholdingofconsultationsmayproceeddirectlytorequesttheestablishmentofapanel.UnderArticle4.7,iftheconsultationsfailtosettleadisputewithin60daysafterthedateofreceiptoftherequestforconsultations,thecomplainingpartymayrequesttheestablishmentofapanel.
    DSU,Article4.
    FinalActEmbodyingtheResultsofTheUruguayRoundofMultilateralTradeNegotiation353,33I.L.M.1125(1994).
    EuropeanCommunities,DiscussionPaperontheReviewoftheDisputeSettlementUnderstanding(DSU).(onfilewithAmericanUniversityInternationalLawReview).
    Ibid.(discussinghowsomeofthesesanctionsarereportedlyalsoproposedbyotherWTOMembers).
    Supranote29.
    ReportoftheAppellateBodyonIndia-patentProtectionforPharmaceuticalandAgriculturalChemicalProducts,Dec.19,1997,WTODoc.WT/DS50/AB/R.para.94.
    DSU,Article8.7.
    JacquesH.J.Bourgeois,SomeReflectionsontheWTODisputeSettlementSystemfromAPractitioner’sPerspective,4(1),JInt’lEconoL(2001)146.DSU,Article8.1.
    Unlessthepartiestothedisputeagreeotherwise.DSU,Article8.3.DSU,supranote6.
    DebraSteger,OverviewofWTODisputeSettlement.Addressatthe1998ConferenceoftheWorldTradeLawAssociation(leavingmainlypanellistsfromNewZealandandSwitzerland);BernhardJansen,SelctedProblemAreasintheCourseofaDisputeSettlementProcedure,FreeWorldTradeandtheEuropeanUnion,59at60(vol28,PublicationsbytheAcademyofEuropeanLawinTier,Bundesanzeiger,2000),(addingpanellistsfromAustraliaandLatinAmericancountries).
    DSU,Article8.7.
    JacquesH.J.Bourgeois,SomeReflectionsontheWTODisputeSettlementSystemfromAPractitioner’sPerspective,4(1),JInt’lEconoL(2001)147.Ibid,148.
    AllanRosas,ECandtheWTODisputeSettlement:SomeReflectionsonPracticeandDoctrine,Presentationatthe37thLeiden-LondonMeeting(June27,1998).
    RudolfOstrihansky,ChambersoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,37Int’l&Comp.L.Q.(1988)30,43.
    Supranote39,p146.
    DSU,Article6.2.
    Supranote20.
    Ibid.Inthearticle,theauthorgiveanexamplethatKoreanproposesthatpartiesshouldberequiredtosubmittheirevidencebynolaterthanthetimeofsecondwrittensubmission.
    WTOAppellateBodyReportonEC-RegimefortheImportation,SaleandDistributionofBananas,Sept.9,1997,WT/DS27AB/R,para.142.
    DebreP.StegerandSusanM.Hainsworth,WorldTradeOrganizationDisputeSettlement:TheFirstThreeYears,1(2)JInt’lEconoL(1998),208.
    DSU,Article17.6.
    DSU,Article17.4.
    DSU,Article17.13.
    DSU,Article17.3.
    Supranote50.
    ECDiscussionPaper.Supranote30.
    DavidPalmeter,TheWTOappellateBodyNeedsRemandAuthority,32,J.WorldTrade,Feb.1998,p41-44.
    Supranote20,p473.
    DSU,Article18.2.
    JohnH.Jackson,DueProcessintheWTODisputeSettlementBody,Addressatthe2ndAnnualConferenceoftheWordTradeLawAssociationiberalisationandProtectionismintheWorldTradingSystem(May15,1998).
    DebraSteger,OverviewofWTODisputeSettlement,Addressatthe2ndAnnualConferenceoftheWorldTradeLawAssociationiberalisationandProtectionintheWorldTradingSystem(May15,1998).
    KofiOtengKufour,FromtheGATTtotheWTO–TheDevelopingCountriesandtheReformoftheProceduresfortheSettlementofInternationalTradeDisputes,31J.WorldTrade,Oct.1997,at177.
    Supranote27,at1231.
    PeterLichtenbaum,DisputeSettlementandInstitutionalIssues,ReactionstoSeattle,3(1)JInt’lEconoL(2000),p174.
    BhagirathLalDas,TheWTOAgreementseficiencies,ImbalancesandRequiredChanges,1998,p9-12.
   
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    JohnH.Jackson,DisputeSettlementandtheWTOEmergingProblems,1(3),JInt’lEconoL(1998),330.TheWorldTradingSystem,109-11(Cambridge,MA:MITPress1997).1995DocumentsSupplementtoLegalProblemsofInternationalEconomicRelations,446(3ded.1995).DueProcessintheWTODisputeSettlementBody,Addressatthe2ndAnnualConferenceoftheWordTradeLawAssociationiberalisationandProtectionismintheWorldTradingSystem(May15,1998).
   
    WernerZdouc,WTODisputeSettlementPracticeRelatingtotheGATS,2(2)JInt’lEconoL(1999),295.
   
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    DecisionontheApplicationandReviewoftheUnderstandingonRulesandProceduresGoverningtheSettlementofDisputes,Apr.15,1994,33I.L.M.1125,1259.
   
    DSU,Articles4.2-4.3,seeWorldTradeOrganization,TheWTODisputeSettlementProcedures,ACollectionoftheRelevantLegalTexts,2ndCambridgeUniversityPress,2001.
   
    HyunChongKim,TheWTODisputeSettlementProcess:APrimer,2(3)JInt’lEconoL,1999,460.
   
    DebraP.StegerandSusanM.Hainsworth,WorldTradeOrganisationDisputeSettlement:TheFirstThreeYears,1(2)JInt’lEconoL1998,201.UnitedNations,HandbookonThePeacefulSettlementofDisputesBetweenStates,10(1992)(OLA/COD/2394).
   
    FinalActEmbodyingtheResultsofTheUruguayRoundofMultilateralTradeNegotiation353,33I.L.M.1125(1994).
   
    EuropeanCommunities,DiscussionPaperontheReviewoftheDisputeSettlementUnderstanding(DSU).].
   
    ReportoftheAppellateBodyonIndia-patentProtectionforPharmaceuticalandAgriculturalChemicalProducts,Dec.19,1997,WTODoc.WT/DS50/AB/R.para.94.
    JacquesH.J.Bourgeois,SomeReflectionsontheWTODisputeSettlementSystemfromAPractitioner’sPerspective,4(1),JInt’lEconoL(2001)146.
    DebraSteger,OverviewofWTODisputeSettlement.Addressatthe1998ConferenceoftheWorldTradeLawAssociation
   
    Jansen,SelctedProblemAreasintheCourseofaDisputeSettlementProcedure,FreeWorldTradeandtheEuropeanUnion,59at60(vol28,PublicationsbytheAcademyofEuropeanLawinTier,Bundesanzeiger,2000).
   
    AllanRosas,ECandtheWTODisputeSettlement:SomeReflectionsonPracticeandDoctrine,Presentationatthe37thLeiden-LondonMeeting(June27,1998).
    RudolfOstrihansky,ChambersoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,37Int’l&Comp.L.Q.(1988)30,43.
   
    WTOAppellateBodyReportonEC-RegimefortheImportation,SaleandDistributionofBananas,Sept.9,1997,WT/DS27AB/R,para.142.
   
    DebreP.StegerandSusanM.Hainsworth,WorldTradeOrganizationDisputeSettlement:TheFirstThreeYears,1(2)JInt’lEconoL(1998),208.DavidPalmeter,TheWTOappellateBodyNeedsRemandAuthority,32,J.WorldTrade,Feb.1998,p41-44.
   
    DebraSteger,OverviewofWTODisputeSettlement,Addressatthe2ndAnnualConferenceoftheWorldTradeLawAssociation:LiberalisationandProtectionintheWorldTradingSystem(May15,1998).
   
    KofiOtengKufour,FromtheGATTtotheWTO–TheDevelopingCountriesandtheReformoftheProceduresfortheSettlementofInternationalTradeDisputes,31J.WorldTrade,Oct.1997,at177.
   
    PeterLichtenbaum,DisputeSettlementandInstitutionalIssues,ReactionstoSeattle,3(1)JInt’lEconoL(2000),p174.
   
    BhagirathLalDas,TheWTOAgreementseficiencies,ImbalancesandRequiredChanges,1998,p9-12.
   
    Editor:ZhenCHEN【出处】
　　此文已被北大法律信息网采用【写作年份】2002【学科类别】国际法->国际经济法