The Value and Possibility of the World-wide Judgments Convention

　　1.Introduction
    Withthedevelopmentsoftheinternationaltransportationandcommunication,internationalcommercehasbeendevelopedtoagreatextent.However,theincreasingofthemultinationaldisputesisfollowingthedevelopmentoftheinternationalcommerce.Tosolvethedisputesinthisfield,besidesthemeanofinternationalarbitration,people,especiallyinthecivilaspect,stillneedtoturntolitigationtoprotecttheirinterests.Themainproblemarisesbecauseinmanyinternationalcivilandcommercialcases,thepropertiesofthepartiesinthedisputesarenotinthesamecountrywheretheawardorthejudgmentwasmade.Therealizationoftheinterestsinthejudgmentorawarddependsonwhetherornottheawardorthejudgmentwillberecognizedbythecourtofrecognitionandthenbeenforced.Thisraisestheproblemofrecognitionandenforcementofaforeignarbitrationawardandjudgment.Formthis,obviously,therecognitionandenforcementofforeignjudgmentincivilandcommercialmattersisthelastprocedureofthelitigationandisthemostimportantphase.Ifthejudgmentoftheoriginstatecannotberecognisedandenforced,thewholeprocedureofthelitigationwillloseitsactualmeaning.Therefore,aworld-widejudgmentissignificantnotonlytoprotecttheinterestoftheplaintiffbutalsotopromotethedevelopmentoftheeconomyandthishasbeengiventhemostattentionbythoseworkinginthefieldofprivateinternationallaw.
    InOctober1999,thePermanentBureauoftheHagueConferencesubmitteda“PreliminaryDraftConventiononJurisdictionandForeignJudgmentinCivilandCommercialMatters”tothememberstatesandstartedthenegotiationaboutaconventiononrecognitionandenforcementofaforeignjudgmentincivilandcommercialmatters.Themaintopicfordiscussionwasaroundtherulesofjurisdiction.Thisessaywillbebasedonthedraftoftheaboveandraisesomeissuesinapproachingtheconvention,evaluateiftheconventionisworthwhileandanalysethepossibilityofapproachingsuchaconventionintheHagueConference.
   
    2.TheSignificanceofaWorld-wideJudgmentsConvention
    Asnotedintheintroduction,aworld-widejudgmentissignificantnotonlytoprotecttheinterestsoftheplaintiffbutalsotopromotethedevelopmentoftheeconomy.Butwhydostatesmeetdifficultiesinapproachingsuchaworld-widejudgmentsconvention?Thereasonsmightbevarious.Firstlybecauseofthesovereigntyofstates,foreignjudgmentshavenoextraterritorialeffectsinothercountries.Onlyfortheinterestsofthestate,willthegovernmentrecogniseaforeignjudgment,but,ifthejudgmentconflictswiththeinterestofthestate,itcannotberecognisedandenforced.Thecauseoftheconflictsmaybethedifferenceinlegalphilosophybetweencivilandcommonlegalsystem.Thecourtofcivillawinacountrymaybesuspiciousofthejudgmentmadebythecourtofacommonlawsystemofanothercountry.Secondly,becauseofthedifferentgroundsofjurisdiction,thecourtmadeajudgmentaccordingthejurisdictionrulesofitsownmightberegardedtohavenojurisdictiononacertaincasebythecourtofrecognition.Thirdly,thejudgmentcannotberecognisedandenforcedifitviolatesthepublicpolicyofthestateofrecognition.
    Somesimilarproblemsappearintheinternationalcommercialarbitrationaswell.However,theNewYorkConventionontheRecognitionandEnforcementofForeignArbitralAwardssolvestheprobleminarbitrationarea.Becauseofthisconvention,partiesofthearbitrationneednotworryabouttherecognitionandenforcementofthearbitrationaward.TheNewYorkConventionmakestheunforeseeable,uncertainandcomplexprocedureofenforcementofarbitrationawardforeseeable,certainandsimple.Returningtotherecognitionandenforcementofjudgment,thesituationismorecomplicated.
    Nevertheless,althoughtherearesomanyproblemstobesolvedintheHagueConference,itisnotimpossibletoapproachaconventiononthejurisdictionandjudgment.ThesuccessofBrusselsConventionandLuganoConventiononJurisdictionandEnforcementofJudgmentsinCivilandCommercialMattersintheEuropeanUniondemonstratehowaworld-widejudgmentsconventioncanbeapproached.ThesuccessfulexperienceofthesetwoconventionsmakesitclearthatifallthememberstatesoftheHagueConferencestandonthesamepositionoftheunificationoftheprivateinternationallegalregulations,giveuptheirexorbitantjurisdictionrulesandlimitthescopeoftheexclusivejurisdictionandpublicpolicy,thenegotiationoftheHagueConferencewillbesatisfiedfinally.Theconsequentconventionwillbelargelyhelpfulinsimplifyingtheprocedureoftheforeignjudgments’recognitionandenforcement,makingtheinternationallitigationforeseeable,certainandprotecttherightfulinterestsofthelitigants.
   
    3.SomeIssuesinApproachingtheConvention
    Toapproachasatisfiedconvention,negotiationsonsomeprimaryissuesareunavoidableintheprocessoftheHagueConference’sdiscussions.However,theseissuesorcontradictionsareespeciallyobviousbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanUnion.Asoneofthemostdevelopedcountriesbothineconomyandinpolitics,thepositionandtheopinionoftheU.S.cannotbeneglectedbytheHagueConference.WhethertheseissueswillbesolvedwilldirectlydecideiftheHagueConferencewillreceiveaconsequentconventiononjurisdictionandforeignjudgmentincivilandcommercialmatters,anddeterminetherealvalueofsuchaconvention.
    Issue1.Thestructureoftheconvention
    BecauseofthesuccessofTheBrusselsConventionandTheLuganoConvention,thePermanentBureauoftheHagueConferenceadoptedthesamestructureasthesetwoconventionsinthePreliminaryDraftwhichwassubmittedtothememberstatesin1999.Inthiskindofstructure,whichiscalleddoubleconvention,theconventionusesbothdirectinternationaljurisdictionandindirectinternationaljurisdictionprinciples,viz.givesoutinwhichsituation(whitelist),acourtshouldhavejurisdictionandinwhichsituation(blacklist),acourtshouldnothavejurisdiction.Comparedwiththesingleconvention,whichonlyprovidethe“whitelist”,thedoubleconventionbasedonthememberstatesthathavethesamelegalsystem,culturebackgroundandpoliticalandeconomicinterestswilllargelypromotethecooperationofthecourtsindifferentstates.TheeffectsarevisibleinthepracticeofEuropeancountryunderTheBrusselsConventionandTheLuganoConvention.Forthisreason,thePermanentBureaufirmlyadoptedthedoubleconventionwhendraftingouttheconventionanddemonstratedsuchastructureshouldbethepremiseofnegotiation.
    However,thedoubleconventionincurredtheoppositionoftheUnitedStatesandsomeothernon-Europecountries.Thenegotiationcomestostalemate.Insteadofdoubleconvention,theUnitedStateswantstoreachamixedconventionwhichwillbemoreflexibleandmoreacceptable.Amixedconventionwilldividethejurisdictionintothreeparts,awhitelist,ablacklistandagreylist.Insomecases,thecourtwillhavediscretiontochooseifithasjurisdictionornot.Thegreylist,insomeinstances,establishesafoundationofnegotiationfortheconvention.Itcanavoidthestalemateandinsomesensitiveareasgivesacushiontotheconflicts.EspeciallyfortheUnitedStates,thestrictproductsliability,tortpunitivedamageandstatutorymultipledamagesofitarehardtobeidentifiedwithbytheothercountries.(Thiswillbedealtwithinthefollowingparagraph.)Ontheotherhand,thelimitationofitsconstitutionwillbeanotherobstacleforapproachingadoubleconvention.Iftheconventionwillbeamixedconvention,itiseasytovoteitthroughintheCongressandmakeitvalid.
    Ontheotherside,groundedontheattainmentsofTheBrusselsConventionandTheLuganoConvention,Europeancountriesbelieveamixedconventionstillleavetheproblemstobesolved.Thegreylistmakesthejurisdictionunclearagain.Inthisarea,thecourtwillstillmakeajudgmentbyitsownjurisdictionrulesandwillalsoleadtothejurisdictionconflicts,whichdeviatethetenetandpurposeoftheconvention.Otherwise,thescopeofthegreyliststillneedbenegotiated.Atoolargegreylistdoesnomorethanmaketheconventionfallintoformalism.
    Althoughthepreliminarydrafttechnicallyseemstobeamixedconvention,thePermanentBureauwasfirmlydeterminedtogetprogressinadoubleconvention.Thedraftdidnotgiveanyflexibilityandroomfordevelopmentaswell.Tosomeextent,itisadraftforEuropeancountriesnotforconsensusofthewholememberstatesoftheHagueConference.Thereforehowtoreachaconsensusonthestructureoftheconventionmightbethefirstproblemingettingamaterialprogressoftheconvention.
    Issue2.ThepunitiveandmultipledamageoftheUnitedStates
    AnotherimportantissuetobesolvedaretheproblemsfromtheUnitedStates.TherearesomanycontradictionsandconflictsbetweenthelegalsystemoftheUnitedStatesandofothercounties.OneofthemostobviousonesishowtheHagueConferencetreatstherecognitionandenforcementofthepunitiveandmultipledamagesclausesintheAmericanjudgment.
    AccordingtotheregulationsoftheUnitedStates,intheareasoftortandantitrust,thepartieswhoviolatetheseregulationsandhurtother’sinterestswillbeawardedapunitiveormultipledamagestotheplaintiff.Apparently,othercountries’courtswillnotacceptsuchdamageclauses.NegotiationonthisissueisanotherimportantpartintheHagueConference.Apossiblesolutionistoexcludesuchaproblemfromtheconvention,whichmightnotbeaeffectivewaytobeacceptedbybothparties.Inthepreliminarydraft,tosolvethisproblem,Article33provides:
    1.Insofarasajudgmentawardsnon-compensatory,includingexemplaryorpunitive,damages,itshallberecognisedatleasttotheextentthatsimilarorcomparabledamagescouldhavebeenawardedintheStateaddressed.
    2.a)Wherethedebtor,afterproceedingsinwhichthecreditorhastheopportunitytobeheard,satisfiesthecourtaddressedthatinthecircumstances,includingthoseexistingintheStateoforigin,grosslyexcessivedamageshavebeenawarded,recognitionmaybelimitedtoalesseramount.
    b)InnoeventshallthecourtaddressedrecognisethejudgmentinanamountlessthanthatwhichcouldhavebeenawardedintheStateaddressedinthesamecircumstances,includingthoseexistingintheStateoforigin.
    3.Inapplyingparagraph1or2,thecourtaddressedshalltakeintoaccountwhetherandtowhatextentthedamagesawardedbythecourtoforiginservetocovercostsandexpensesrelatingtotheproceedings.
    However,evenalthoughthedelegationoftheUnitedStatescouldmakeconcessiononthisarticle,somesimilarproblemsstillexist.“Largepainandsufferingawardsmaywellbeseenas‘excessive’byothernations”.ThereisafailedexamplebetweentheUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdom,whichhavethesamelanguageandsamecommonlawsystem.ItiseasytounderstandthedifficultiestobeovercomeintheHagueConferencewhichcomprisedifferentlegalsystems,differentlegalphilosophiesanddifferentkindsofregimes.
    Issue3.Theinterpretationoftheconvention
    Howtointerprettheconventionisanotherissue.TheBrusselsConventionandTheLuganoConventionworkbecausetheJudgeofEuropeanCommunitytakestheresponsibilityoftheinterpretation.However,thereisnotsuchaorganintheHagueConference.Thislackwillmakedifferentcomprehensionstothesameclauseandcauseconflictsonjurisdiction.Althoughthedraftin1999providesaspecialarticletouniforminterpretation,itcanhardlybeacceptedbythememberstates.Firstly,whowillbethefirstonetoapplytheconventionandifitsapplicationisappropriateandinconformitytotheoriginalintentionoftheconvention.Secondly,usingthecaselawisnottheprimarymethodtomanycivillawcountries.Couldthecourtsofthesecountriesinvokeforeignjudgmentsappropriately?
    Issue4.Someotherissues
    Comparedwiththeissuesmentionedabove,thefollowingonesarenotsoobviousandimportant,buttheyarestillnecessarytobediscussed.Oneofthemisthescopeoftheconvention.Ononeside,thepreliminarydraftexcludemanydisputedsituations,e.g.thestatusandlegalcapacityofnaturalpersons,maintenanceobligations,matrimonialpropertyregimesandotherrightsandobligationsarisingoutofmarriageorsimilarrelationships,willsandsuccession,insolvency,compositionoranalogousproceedings,socialsecurity,arbitrationandproceedingsrelatedtheretoandadmiraltyormaritimematters.Suchalargeexclusiverangewillpossiblymakestheconventionuselessinmostdisputes.Ontheotherside,theconventiondoesnotdealwiththeareasofintellectualpropertyandelectroniccommercewhichhavebeengiventhemostattentionbythelawcircles.TheHagueConferencemayhaveapotentialeffectontheseareas.
    Thelastissue,whichneedtobepaidmoreattentionbythememberstates,isthattheHagueConferenceisaninternationalorganizationwiththepurposeofuniformingtheregulationsonprivateinternationallaw.Itshouldnotbecontrolledbyanyinterestgroupsoranyotherregionalliances.However,tosomeextent,theHagueConferencenowadaysrepresentsmoreinclinationoftheEuropeancountriesbecauseoftheirmoreseatsintheconferenceandthesameeconomicandpoliticalinterests.Thisinclinationresultsinsomeobstaclesinthenegotiation.WhethertheHagueConferencewillconsidermoreaboutallthememberstates’will,whetheritcanbreakthroughthelimitationofTheBrusselsConventionandstandonthepositionofitsinternationalorganizationwilldeterminethesuccessoftheconsequentconvention.
   
    4.Conclusion
    Itishardtomakeaconclusionifajudgmentconventionwillbeapproachedundersuchatoughenvironment.Apparently,theseriousproblemabouttheUnitedStatesisanobstacletoovercome.AsuccessfulnegotiationreachedbythedelegationsoftheEuropeancountriesandtheUnitedStateswillundoubtedlybeagiantsteptowardamorecloselyintegratedworld-widelegalsystemandwillalsohaveapotentinfluenceontheproblemsofothercountries.Ontheotherhand,inspiteofthepossibilitythattheconventionwillbeunpracticaltosomeextent,itselfhasincontestablyasalutaryinfluenceoncreatingasolidfoundationforthedevelopmentofunificationoftheprivateinternationalrules.NotmatterajudgmentconventionwillbecreatedbytheHagueConferenceorbyothermeans,theHagueConferenceatleastisagoodstartandsurelyisahistoriclandmarkfortheuniformjurisdictionrules.
    【注释】
　　DepeiHan,TheNewPrivateInternationalLaw(ChineseEdition),WuhanUniversityPress,1997,P666
“Demonstratinggreatercomfortwiththeideaofjudicialdiscretion,thecommonlawcountriesseemtofavorthedoctrine;demonstratinggreatersuspicionoftheideaofjudicialdiscretion,thecivillawcountriesseemtoopposeit.”PatrickJ.Borchers,AFewLittleIssuesfortheHagueJudgmentNegotiation,1998,24BrooklynJ.Int'lL.157
T.VonMehren,RecognitionandEnforcementofForeignJudgment:ANewApproachfortheHagueConference?,Law&ContemporaryLegalProblems,1994,P271-287

JoachimZekoll,“CouldaTreatyTrumpSupremeCourtJurisdictionalDoctrine?”:TheRoleandStatusofAmericanLawintheHagueJudgmentsConventionProject,1998,61Alb.L.Rev.1283
ArthurT.VonMehren,DraftingaConventiononInternationalJurisdictionandtheEffectsofForeignJudgmentsAcceptableWorld-wide:CantheHagueConferenceProjectSucceed?,2001,49Am.J.Comp.L.191

“….itwasessentiallydraftedasadoubleconvention…Thedraftacceptspermittedbasesgrudgingly;flexibilityandroomfordevelopmentarenotseenasadvantages;mostimportantly,thedraftislargelytheresultofmajoritarianratherthanconsensusthinking.”ArthurT.VonMehren,DraftingaConventiononInternationalJurisdictionandtheEffectsofForeignJudgmentsAcceptableWorld-wide:CantheHagueConferenceProjectSucceed?,2001,49Am.J.Comp.L.191
PreliminaryDraftConventiononJurisdictionandForeignJudgmentinCivilandCommercialMatters,http://hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html(visited29October,2002)
PatrickJ.Borchers,AFewLittleIssuesfortheHagueJudgmentNegotiations,1998,24BrooklynJ.Int'lL.157

PreliminaryDraftConventiononJurisdictionandForeignJudgmentinCivilandCommercialMattersprovides:
Article38Uniforminterpretation
1.IntheinterpretationoftheConvention,regardistobehadtoitsinternationalcharacterandtotheneedtopromoteuniformityinitsapplication.
2.ThecourtsofeachContractingStateshall,whenapplyingandinterpretingtheConvention,takedueaccountofthecaselawofotherContractingStates.
PreliminaryDraftConventiononJurisdictionandForeignJudgmentinCivilandCommercialMatters,Article1【写作年份】2002【学科类别】国际法->国际私法